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Abstract – This paper aims at evaluating the impact of two different cash transfer programs in rural 
Mexico – Procampo and Progresa – on total consumption, food consumption and other outcomes like 
investment, schooling and health care. Progresa is targeted to women, while Procampo goes to farmers, 
mostly  men and many of which are poor. We show that both programs boost consumption. However, 
they obtain this effect through different channels. Progresa is destined to consumption expenditure 
directly, while Procampo, which is paid to landholders, boosts investments and needs time to produce its 
benefits. Furthermore, we separate program from gender effects and show that cash transfer programs 
targeted to men are beneficial only when the recipients own means of production. This suggest that 
policy makers should take into account the relationship between gender and ownership of assets when 
designing poverty reduction programs. 
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1.  I NTRODUCTION 
The degree and depth of rural poverty around the world suggests a continued and expanding need to 
promote rural and agricultural development in developing countries. However, with limited and 
increasingly scarce resources it is not clear which actions are best suited to promote development.  Many 
argue that the use of traditional agricultural policies – such as subsidies on staple foods, credit provision 
through state agricultural banks, trade protection and exchange rate manipulation, and state provision or 
subsidization of agricultural inputs – are inefficient and inappropriate mechanisms for promoting 
agricultural development and reducing rural poverty. Increasingly, policy makers are shifting from 
traditional broad-based agricultural policies towards more targeted programs that create less distortions 
in the economy. 
One type of social protection intervention that has become increasingly popular in recent years are 
transfer programs that provide cash or quasi cash (such as transferable vouchers) to poor households.  
In this paper, cash transfer interventions are examined with specific reference to two programs 
implemented by the Government of Mexico: the Program of Direct Payments to the Countryside 
(PROCAMPO) and the National Program for Education, Health and Nutrition (PROGRESA).  The 
reason for the focus on these particular projects is that they represent two distinct forms of cash transfer 
programs and have been implemented in rural areas of a single country. PROCAMPO is a program 
designed to respond to the adjustment poverty that was expected as a result of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  As a consequence of NAFTA, the prices of basic crops for producers were 
expected to drop sharply since these crop prices had been supported at levels above the border price.  
PROCAMPO was initiated at the same time as the NAFTA agreement (1994) to compensate producers 
of these crops for losses incurred from trade liberalization.  Since PROCAMPO is geared towards 
farmers, the primary recipients of the cash transfers are male landowners.  Although not explicitly a 
poverty alleviation program, the transfers are widely distributed across agricultural Mexico and many 
recipients are categorized as poor.  
Unlike PROCAMPO, PROGRESA is a national anti-poverty program specifically designed to deal with 
chronic poverty.  Benefits are targeted to households living in extreme and moderate poverty.  Cash 
transfers are conditional, however, on school attendance by children, basic health care checkups by all 
family members, and attendance at public health lectures. PROGRESA benefits are also gender-targeted 
with transfers generally going to the mother, or responsible female adult, of the family.  The motivation 
for this targeting is the belief, supported by the development literature, that females are more likely to 
spend income on food, health and education than are males.   
Cash transfer programs like PROGRESA and PROCAMPO induce intended and unintended behavioral 
responses among recipients.  Intended responses may include, as in the case of PROGRESA, increased 
school enrolment.  Unintended responses may include changes in labor allocation or undesirable 
consumption spending (on alcohol or tobacco for example).  One possible response among recipients, 
which may or may not be intended, is to invest transfer income in productive activities, thus potentially 
creating a multiplicative effect.  This is likely to be the case particularly when households are credit 
constrained and unable to obtain cash for investment.  Such indirect effects are likely to assist in the 
development of rural areas and the agricultural sector. 
The income multipliers of cash transfer programs depend on a number of factors, including the design of 
the program.  One key factor might be whether the primary male or female in the household receives the 
transfer.  Evidence from the literature suggests that expenditure of income is dependent on the gender of 
the recipient. On average, women are found to spend more income on child education, health and 
nutrition than men.  In fact, the motivation for providing cash transfers directly to women is the 
assumption that they will spend the income for these purposes.  This is considered socially desirable 
since it enhances investment in human capital and supports long-term development.  However, if men 




assets, then this may lead to higher income in the future and higher consumption in general for the 
household (including on education and nutrition).  
The objectives of this paper are to examine cash transfers with specific reference to PROCAMPO and 
PROGRESA in order to evaluate the effects of different types of transfer programs on poverty 
alleviation and rural development and the role of gender in this process.  Toward this end, the remainder 
of the paper is divided into five sections.  Section 2 looks at the literature on gender and intrahousehold 
allocation to understand what the likely impact of providing transfers to men versus women might be 
and how important this is in program design. Section 3 discusses the data used for this study providing a 
brief description of the sampled households.  Section 4 presents the empirical approach for evaluating 
the effects of PROCAMPO and PROGRESA.  Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis as 
well as a discussion of the results.  Finally, Section 6 provides conclusions and discusses the policy 
implications of the analysis. 
 
2.  G ENDER-TARGETING AND CASH TRANSFERS 
One of the key differences between PROGRESA and PROCAMPO is that the former gives preference 
to providing transfers directly to women while PROCAMPO, with rare exception, provides transfers to 
men.  The basis for PROGRESA providing transfers to women instead of men is the increasing evidence 
that women spend income from own-earnings differently from men and, in particular, tend to spend 
more on children's health and nutrition (Haddad, 1999).  Only in the absence of a responsible female 
adult is a male designated the PROGRESA recipient.  In this section, the gender dimension of cash 
transfers is examined.  As a first step the literature on intrahousehold resource allocation is briefly 
reviewed. 
The issue of intrahousehold allocation comes fundamentally down to how households make decisions 
regarding the use of resources.  In the last decade, there has been a growing literature that has attempted 
to test the validity of different models of the household.
1  Much of the debate has centered on the 
validity of the "unitary" model of the household as compared to a number of "collective" models.  While 
a discussion of the accuracy of different models of household behavior is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it should be noted that the results of these studies indicate that the costs of neglecting the process of 
intrahousehold resource allocation may be high (Alderman, Haddad and Hoddinott, 1997).   
Evaluating gender differences in the allocation of income has been approached in two ways: 1) 
examining the allocation of resources by female-headed, as opposed to male-headed, households 
(Handa, 1994; Kennedy and Peters, 1992); and 2) exploring how the allocation of income is influenced 
by the relative income earned by the activities of men and women and how income allocation is 
influenced by the asset position (bargaining power) of male and female household members (Hoddinot 
and Haddad, 1995; Thomas, 1997; Hopkins, Levine and Haddad, 1994; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 
2000).   
The literature suggests that women are more likely than men to spend income on food (nutrition), health 
and education of their children than men. This empirical evidence forms one of the basis for providing 
transfers to women instead of men, especially for a program such as PROGRESA where a primary 
objective is improved health and education outcomes. In addition to noting that women spend more 
income on food, health and education, some studies indicate that expenditure on alcohol and tobacco are 
positively related to the share of income that goes to men (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995).
2  Others note 
that single MHHs devote more to tobacco than partnered MHHs and single FHHs devote less to alcohol 
                                                 
1 See Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman (1997a) and Strauss and Thomas (1995) for reviews of this literature. 
2 Note, however, that the average share of expenditures on alcohol and tobacco in the study is only 3.2% of total expenditure 




than partnered FHHs (Handa, 1996).  The image created by these studies is that females spend income 
on food, health and education for their children and males spend income on alcohol and tobacco. 
As noted in section 2, however, one of the benefits of cash transfers is the multiplier effect on the 
household and the local economy. This suggests that these households are receiving substantial benefits 
from the investment of PROCAMPO transfers.  If the multiplier effect differs by the gender of the 
recipient and, in particular, is lower for female transfer recipients, this presents an interesting trade-off.  
Transfers to men would bring about larger multiplier effects than transfers to women and bring about 
greater medium-term gains in income and thus expenditures.  Transfers to women while bringing 
smaller multiplier effects, bring greater immediate nutrition benefits to children and longer benefits in 
terms of human capital development because of expenditures on education and health.  One of the 
purposes of this paper is to determine how the multiplier effects may differ by gender by examining the 
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA programs.  
However, the evaluation of the gender effects is complicated by other factors. If PROCAMPO does lead 
to a higher multiplier effect, it could be because men invest more than women as a rule but it also could 
be because the owners of assets such as land, whether they be men or women, are more likely to invest 
transfers.  If the latter is the case, this suggests that it is not simply gender that matters in transfer 
programs but other characteristics such as asset ownership.  This brings up another issue of whether 
transfer programs should be linked directly to productive activities, such as is the case with 
PROCAMPO. Not linking transfers to productive activities is a common criticism of programs like 
PROGRESA. 
The purpose in evaluating PROCAMPO and PROGRESA is first to examine whether the programs lead 
to different outcomes in terms of expenditures and investment.  The initial hypothesis is that 
PROGRESA will lead to increased expenditures on food, education and health because it is directed 
preferentially to women.  However, since PROCAMPO leads to greater investment it is likely, over 
time, to bring about increased income levels which will also lead to increased expenditures.  This 
increase may offset any differences that are attributable to gender.  Along with establishing the effects of 
each program on expenditures, in the case of PROCAMPO, we want to determine if it is gender or some 
other aspect of the program that influences the investment effect.  In the case of PROGRESA, we want 
to establish if increased expenditures are only linked to women, or if men receiving PROGRESA 
respond similarly.  Differentiating gender from other program effects is complicated by a number of 
selectivity issues discussed in section 4.  
 
3. THE DATA  
To evaluate the differential effects of PROGRESA and PROCAMPO, we use data that was collected to 
evaluate PROGRESA but includes information on the receipt of PROCAMPO transfers. Data collected 
for the evaluation of PROGRESA are structured as follows. A first source of data is the census 
(ENCASEH) conducted in 1997 in all communities selected for participation in PROGRESA and which 
formed the basis for the selection of beneficiary households.  Since it covered all PROGRESA 
communities, including those households surveyed for the PROGRESA evaluation, the census serves as 
a baseline survey for this study.
3  Second, as part of an evaluation based on an experimental design, 505 
PROGRESA communities were selected and randomly allocated into treatment and control groups.   
Only households in the treatment communities received PROGRESA.  The random assignment of 
localities allows for a more rigorous evaluation of PROGRESA and ensures that there is only a limited 
probability that differences between treatment and control groups are due to unobserved factors (see 
Behrman and Todd, 1999). As part of this evaluation, a survey (ENCEL) was conducted in these 
                                                 
3 A baseline household survey (ENCEL) was carried out in both the treatment and control communities in March, 1998, prior 
to the initiation of PROGRESA payments in May, 1998.  However, the data is not as complete as ENCASEH and the census 




selected communities in October 1998.
4  For this study, the 1997 ENCASEH survey and this 1998 
ENCEL survey are used.  
Because of the careful construction of the data set, participation in PROGRESA can be considered 
random, thus limiting problems of selection and program placement bias.  Selection bias occurs when 
households choose to participate in a program and the impact from a program cannot be distinguished 
from differences in outcomes due to inherent differences between those that chose to and those that 
chose not to participate. Program placement bias occurs when program eligibility requirements 
differentiate participant and non-participant households and it is not possible to distinguish program 
effects from effects that are due to program eligibility requirements.  PROGRESA is free from either of 
these biases.  However, PROCAMPO had already been operating for a few years when the evaluation 
was initiated, and the sample was not chosen in order to minimize problems of selection and program 
placement bias.  In the analysis below, we must rely on econometric techniques to control for and 
minimize these potential sources of bias.  
The ENCEL surveys collected data on all households in the 505 communities, both treatment and 
control, numbering over 24,000 households in total. We focus our attention on families originally 
classified as poor
5.   
 
Table 1. Allocation of households to program categories 
Number of  obs=12,625  PROGRESA Non-
PROGRESA 
Total 
PROCAMPO  26% 16% 42% 
Non-PROCAMPO  32% 26% 58% 
Total 58%  42%  100% 
Table 1 presents allocation of households across the four categories of households in the sample. The 
sample can be divided as follows: Group 1: PROGRESA and PROCAMPO recipients (26% of all 
households), Group 2: PROGRESA recipients only (32%), Group 3: PROCAMPO recipients only 
(16%), and GROUP 4: non-recipients (26%). Households in groups 3 and 4 are considered poor by 
PROGRESA but located in the control communities.  Overall, 58% of the sample receive PROGRESA, 
42% receive PROCAMPO and 74% receive at least one type of transfer.  
Table 2 (p. 14) summarizes the data on expenditures, investment, cash transfers, household 
characteristics and regional differences that are used in this analysis.  In column 1, data from the entire 
sample is presented while columns 2-5 report the results for the four household categories. It is expected 
that PROGRESA (categories 1 and 2) and non-PROGRESA (categories 3 and 4) households will have 
similar characteristics, as treatment and control communities were chosen randomly. PROCAMPO 
                                                 
4. Following the 1998 surveys two additional ENCEL surveys were conducted in March and October 1999.  Results from the 
evaluation of PROGRESA show that the main impact of Progresa in terms of schooling, health, and consumption is found 
after the initial 6 months of the program (October 1998).  After that, the impact does not get bigger, and in fact in some cases, 
is reduced. Thus we only use the first round, and not subsequent rounds--we expect no difference in terms of results.  More 
importantly, PROCAMPO households in ENCEL October 1998 have been in the program for 4 years.  It is safe to assume 
that the long term benefits (multiplier effect) of PROCAMPO are fully realized by this time. 
5 Initially, PROGRESA classified as eligible about 52% of households. Afterward, due to perceived bias against certain kinds 
of poor households (especially elderly with no children), criteria of eligibility were revised and the program was extended to 
cover 78% of households. This expansion is known as “densification”. Because of the revision of the criteria of eligibility, 
households included in the second phase have different characteristics. As these households were declared eligible later, most 
of them started receiving cash transfers some time after the initial households, so that the impact of PROGRESA on their 




participation is not randomly assigned in the survey so some differences between PROCAMPO 
(categories 1 and 3) and non-PROCAMPO (categories 2 and 4) are expected to emerge. 
On average, households spend approximately 170 pesos per capita each month. Food expenditures 
represent the single highest expenditure representing approximately 80% of total expenditures.  Health 
expenditures are the second highest expenditure.  As anticipated, investment is higher for PROCAMPO 
households than other households and in particular agricultural spending is much higher.  PROGRESA 
transfers are between three and four times greater than PROCAMPO transfers.  For PROGRESA 
recipients, the transfer represents about 25% of total monthly expenditure while for PROCAMPO 
recipients the transfer represents less than 10% of total expenditure. For households who receive both 
types of transfers, the combination provides on average 34% of total expenditure. Both of these 
programs represent significant contributions to household income. 
The PROCAMPO households, split into categories 1 and 3, appear to have different characteristics as 
compared to categories 2 and 4.  PROCAMPO households depend on agricultural and livestock 
production for their livelihood; they have much larger land and livestock holdings, and they participate 
less in non-agricultural wage labor. On average PROCAMPO households are larger than non 
PROCAMPO households – one reason for their lower per capita levels of expenditure – and are further 
along in the life cycle, with slightly older household heads.  PROCAMPO households also have a higher 
share of speakers of an indigenous language. They are better off in terms of infrastructure such as 
electricity and pipe water, and their dwelling less often have dirt floors.  These results suggest care must 
be taken in evaluating the effects of PROCAMPO. It must also be kept in mind that these PROCAMPO 
households are unlikely to be representative of PROCAMPO households nationwide, but instead poorer 
than average given the nature of the PROGRESA sample. 
 
4.  E VALUATING THE EFFECTS OF PROCAMPO AND PROGRESA: THE EMPIRICAL 
APPROACH 
In order to analyze the effect of PROGRESA and PROCAMPO transfers, we begin by estimating total 
consumption expenditures per capita
6 to determine the overall impact of the programs on household 
consumption.  Total consumption expenditure is a function of non-transfer income, PROGRESA and 
PROCAMPO transfer income and preferences.  While data on non-transfer income is available in the 
data set, it is endogenous and contains substantial measurement error.  A normal response to dealing 
with this problem would be to use an instrumental variables approach (Greene, 1997).  However, since 
our interest lies in comparing the effects of PROGRESA and PROCAMPO on total expenditure, 
including non-transfer income in the regression is not necessary.  We therefore choose to include 
directly in the regression the set of exogenous variables that would be used to explain non-transfer 
income.
7  These variables include measures of human capital and other household assets as well as 
regional dummies, which control for regional differences in the ability to generate income that are due to 
differences in infrastructure, public services, etc. A number of these variables, particularly age and 
gender of the head of household, whether the household is indigenous and education levels, may also 
reflect differences in preferences across households.  However, distinguishing the effects of non-transfer 
income and preferences on total consumption expenditure is not the main concern of this study and the 
specification is therefore sufficient to meet our needs. Note that all these variables come from the 
baseline survey while the expenditure and transfer data come from subsequent surveys, in order to 
ensure the exogeneity of these variables. The estimated equation can be expressed as follows: 
(1)  Ci = b0 + b1*PROGRESAi + b2*PROCAMPOi + b3*Xi + ui 
                                                 
6 To obtain per capita values a per adult equivalent was used. 
7 In effect, we are reducing the number of equations in our system by substituting the non-transfer income equation into the 




where Ci represents monthly per capita total consumption expenditure of the i
th household; 
PROCAMPOi and PROGRESAi are monthly per capita payments from the two transfer programs, Xi is 
a vector of socio-economic characteristics of household i, and ui is the error term. To determine if the 
impact of a PROGRESA peso is different from a PROCAMPO peso we test the following null and 
alternative hypotheses: 
H0: b1 ≠ b2;   H1: b1 = b2 
An important issue to consider is the inclusion of data on the transfer payments in the regression.  Both 
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA cash transfers are reported in the surveys. While participation in 
PROGRESA is randomized at the locality level, the data suggest that a number of households receive 
PROGRESA transfers that are less than their eligibility.  It is not clear why this is the case.  It could be 
administrative mistakes or it could be a household choice not to complete all program requirements.  
Whatever the reason, this may make the PROGRESA transfer amounts endogenous.  To overcome this 
problem, we instrument the PROGRESA transfer. For the instrument, we use the intent to treat (ITT), 
which is the theoretical amount that should be paid to households that are entitled to participate in the 
program. As such, ITT is a good predictor of actual receipts and is exogenous to the system (Bloom, 
1984).  The data on the PROCAMPO transfer is fraught with additional estimation problems.   
PROCAMPO was initiated in 1994, long before the survey was conducted. Since PROCAMPO is not a 
randomized program, bias may be introduced into the estimation by the fact that households choose to 
participate (selection bias) or by the design of the program (program placement bias). Furthermore, 
transfers received from PROCAMPO may also be less than household eligibility.  Like PROGRESA, to 
overcome these problems we instrument the PROCAMPO transfer using the intent to treat. Total 
consumption expenditure is then estimated as presented in equation 1 where PROGRESA and 
PROCAMPO are instruments substituted for the actual transfer values.   
The estimation of equation 1 provides information on the overall impact of the transfer programs on 
expenditure.  As noted earlier, however, the design of the two programs may lead to differences in the 
way income is allocated across expenditure categories.  To examine this hypothesis, we examine the 
effect of the programs on household expenditure in seven expenditure categories: food, school expenses, 
health and hygiene, children clothes, adult clothes, energy and other goods.  The specification of the 
model is the same as in equation 1 (including using instruments for PROGRESA and PROCAMPO) 
with the dependent variable changed to be the expenditure in the particular category as follows: 
(2)  C(j)i = b0 + b1*PROGRESAi + b2*PROCAMPOi + b3*Xi + ui 
where C(j)i is the expenditure on good j by household i.   
The next stage of analysis is to examine the specific outcomes that are associated with each of the 
transfer programs. Both programs involve cash transfers, but PROCAMPO is directed towards 
households with a specific productive asset – agricultural land – and is expected to have a positive effect 
on investment, particularly investment in agriculture. On the other hand, PROGRESA is thought to have 
less of an impact on capital accumulation and investment (putting aside the very long term accumulation 
of human capital), since it is given to household members who do not typically own productive assets—
in particular women.  To explore this, data on investment expenditure in agriculture and business 
(nonagriculture) are used.  Since a number of households do not invest, the data is censored at zero and a 
tobit model is appropriate. The equation is specified as follows:   
(3)  INVi = b0 + b1*PROGRESAi + b2*PROCAMPOi + b3*Xi + ui 
where INVi is investment by household i.  This model is estimated for total investment, agricultural 
investment and business investment.   
A corollary to the hypothesis that PROCAMPO induces investment is that this investment should lead to 
higher income and thus higher expenditure. To evaluate this hypothesis, we want to look at the evolution 




they receive, we would expect the program to take some time to show its effects: as PROCAMPO 
started in 1994, the effect of cash transfers should be bigger in 1998 than in, for example, 1996. 
However, if PROCAMPO money is spent directly on consumption goods (a “one dollar is always one 
dollar” hypothesis), we should find that the effect of the transfer was the same in 1996 as in 1998. This 
hypothesis can be tested using data from the 1996 Enigh survey. The testing of this hypothesis is done 
by pooling the 1996 and 1998 data and estimating an equation similar in structure to equation 1, as 
follows:  
(4)  Ci =  b0 + b0_96*DUM96 + b1*PROGRESAi + b2*PROCAMPOi + 
b2_96*PROCAMPO96i +  b3*Xi + b3_96*X96i + ui 
where DUM96 is a dummy variable representing a 1996 observation, PROCAMPO96i is the 
PROCAMPO transfer for 1996 for household i and X96i are the household characteristics for 1996.  If 
PROCAMPO only has an immediate effect on consumption, we expect that the coefficients on 
PROCAMPO will be the same for 1996 and 1998 while if there is an investment effect we expect that 
the coefficient for 1998 to be larger.  We therefore are testing the following null and alternative 
hypotheses: 
H0: b2_96 = b2;   H1: b2_96 < b2 
Turning to the requirements of PROGRESA, we want to look at whether PROGRESA has had the 
expected impact on schooling and health.  Equations 2 examine how PROGRESA and PROCAMPO 
transfers changed the level of expenditure on schooling and health.  With the available data, it is also 
possible to directly analyze school enrolment and use of medical services by households.  The 
determinants of the probability of school enrolment and use of medical services by a child are expected 
to be non-transfer income, transfer income, preferences and child characteristics.  As with the previous 
equations, non-transfer income and preferences are included in the estimation using household 
characteristics.  The following equations are then estimated at the individual level, using data only for 
those families with school age children:  
(5)  P(SEj,i) = b0 + b1*PROGRESAi + b2*PROCAMPOi + b3*Xi + b4*Zj,i + uj,i 
(6)  P(HCj,i) = b0 + b1*PROGRESAi + b2*PROCAMPOi + b3*Xi + b4*Zj,i + uj,i 
where SEj,i is a dummy for school enrolment of child j in household i, HCj,i is a dummy for medical 
check-up of child j in household i and Zj,i is a vector of individual characteristics of child j in household 
i, such as age and gender. The probit models are estimated with clusters at the household level to 
account for the autocorrelation created by the fact some children belonging to the same family. 
Separating gender and program effects 
For each of the above estimations, PROGRESA and PROCAMPO are included as independent variables 
in the analysis in order to distinguish the effects of each program.  However, as noted in an earlier 
section of the paper, we are particularly interested in evaluating how the gender of the recipient affects 
consumption.  While PROGRESA is targeted to women and PROCAMPO directed to landowners, who 
are principally men, there are a number of cases in which recipients belong to the other gender (for each 
program, about 10%). Given that this is the case, this information can be used to isolate the gender effect 
of these cash transfers from the program effect.  To do this, PROGRESA and PROCAMPO transfers are 
divided by the gender of the recipient and included in the estimation independently.  For example, 
equation 1 is rewritten as follows: 
(1’) Ci =  b0 + b1_f*PROGRESAfi + b1_m*PROGRESAmi +  
b2_f*PROCAMPOfi + b2_m*PROCAMPOmi + b3*Xi + ui 
where adding f to the variable name indicates that the payment goes to a woman and m indicates a 
payment to a man. PROCAMPOfi is equal to PROCAMPOi if the recipient is female, to zero otherwise; 




and PROGRESA are due to the gender of the recipient or to some other reason, such as program 
conditionality requirements. Four sets of null and alternative hypotheses can be tested: gender effect in 
PROGRESA (H0: b1_f = b1_m;   H1: b1_f ≠ b1_m); gender effect in PROCAMPO (H0: b2_f = b2_m;   H1: 
b2_f ≠ b2_m); program effect for women (H0: b1_f = b2_f;   H1: b1_f ≠ b2_f); program effect for men (H0: 
b1_m = b2_m;   H1: b1_m ≠ b2_m). 
Along with the problems noted earlier with using the actual transfer data, there is an additional problem 
associated with dividing the transfer data by gender.  Male PROGRESA beneficiaries may not be 
representative of the overall population of males and female PROCAMPO beneficiaries representative 
of the overall population of females. Male PROGRESA beneficiaries may be more “motherly” than 
typical males, since they tend to be single parents.  Similarly, female PROCAMPO beneficiaries, who 
are likely to be farmers, may have different characteristics than average women.  This has the potential 
to create bias in the estimated coefficients.  In order to estimate the above equation correctly, we 
generate an instrument for the gender of the recipient.  
In summary, each of the models (equations 1-6) are estimated using the specification noted above with 
instruments for PROGRESA and PROCAMPO (model 1).  Along with this estimation, a second 
specification is run (model 2) for each equation (equations 1’-6’) to differentiate the gender and program 
effects with appropriate instruments used for the gender-specific transfers. 
 
5. RESULTS:  WHAT WE EXPECTED AND WHAT WE GOT 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression on total consumption expenditure for the two alternative 
model specifications (equations 1 and 1”).  Only the results for the transfer variables are presented here 
(full results in appendix 1, p. 15)
8.  On the right hand side, tests of equality of the coefficients are 
presented. 
Table 3. On the left: results of the regression for total consumption. On the right, test of equality of the coefficients. The first column 
indicates which coefficient is larger, and the second the results of the F-test on the equality of the two coefficients.  A "no" indicates that 
the null hypothesis cannot be ejected—the coefficients are not statistically different from each other. 
The results from Model 1 indicate that an increase of one peso in PROGRESA cash transfer leads to an 
increase in consumption of 0.27 pesos and a one peso increase in PROCAMPO leads to  an increase in 
total  consumption by 0.36 pesos.  Both results are significantly different from zero.  Tests of difference 
between the PROGRESA and PROCAMPO coefficients suggest the null hypothesis that they are not 
equal can be rejected.  The first conclusion that can be drawn is that not all the money provided by 
PROCAMPO are spent on alcohol. The program has a positive effect on total consumption, either 
through direct purchase or through investment returns. Overall, each program has a similar effect on 
consumption (even if after different amounts of time).  The results from Model 2 suggest that male 
recipient of PROGRESA transfers behave differently than female PROGRESA recipients and male 
PROCAMPO recipients. It is not simply the gender of the recipient that matters but the combination of 
                                                 
8 Lack of space prevents us from presenting the full results for all the models in this version of the paper. The table of full 
results is presented only for model 1 and 1’,  in Appendix 1, p. 15. 
Summary, total expenditure Total expenditure, tests of equality
Model 1 coef t-stat Model 1 diff signif
PROGRESA (ITT) .274 3.14 PROGRESA vs. PROCAMPO < no
PROCAMPO (ITT) .360 5.82
Model 2 Model 2
PROGRESA received by female .283 3.20 F PROGRESA vs. M PROGRESA >y e s
PROGRESA received by male .050 .44 F PROCAMPO vs. M PROCAMPO >n o
PROCAMPO received by female .545 3.21 F PROGRESA vs. F PROCAMPO <n o




the gender and program design.  This constitutes the first strike against conventional wisdom.  Not all 
men are drunkards, or if they are, they at least spend some of their money in a responsible fashion if the 
program is designed appropriately. 
The results for household characteristics and regional dummies are robust across the two model 
specifications. Not surprisingly, household size leads to a reduction of per capita expenditures. The age 
of the household head is negatively associated with expenditures as older household heads spend less.  
Female headed and indigenous households have significantly lower expenditures.  Somewhat surprising 
results are that the number of economically active males in the family and the average male education 
level are associated with lower expenditures.  It is not clear why this might be the case, especially among 
poorer households that are represented in the PROGRESA data sets.  The presence of a dirt floor, a clear 
sign of asset poverty, results in lower expenditures.  Ownership of higher value assets, such as irrigated 
land and livestock, is positively associated with higher consumption reflecting the higher income 
potential of these households. Regions 5 (Sierra Gorda),  6 (Montaña (Guerrero)) and  28 (Altiplano 
(San Luis Potosi)) appear to have lower expenditures than the base region (region 3: Sierra Norte-Otomí 
Tepehua), while Region  27 (Tierra Caliente (Michoacan)) appears to have significantly higher 
expenditures. 
The next step is to estimate the seven categories of expenditure (food, schooling, kids clothes, health, 
energy, adult clothes and other expenditure) for the two alternative models (equations 2 and 2’).  A 
summary of results and tests of differences are presented in Table 4 (p. 14). Because of the importance 
of food for the nutrition of households and the fact that it makes up around 80% of total expenditures, 
we begin by examining food expenditures.  Both programs have positive and significant effects on food 
consumption. Similar results are found when differentiating by gender.   Transfers to both genders in 
both programs lead to increased food expenditures, and all coefficients are significant, except for male 
PROGRESA beneficiaries. As can be seen in Table 4, the null hypotheses of equality of coefficients 
cannot be rejected for any of the pairings in the two models. 
The next step in the analysis is to consider household expenditure on non-food items. The results for the 
non-food expenditures are where differences finally begin to merge between the two programs. While 
PROGRESA has a positive and significant effect on schooling expenditure, the effect of PROCAMPO is 
not significantly different from zero. The F-test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the two 
coefficients.  Looking at Model 2, only PROGRESA transfers received by females significantly increase 
school expenditures.  However, the hypothesis that female and male PROGRESA recipients are the 
same cannot be rejected.  Furthermore, there is a significant difference between female PROGRESA and 
PROCAMPO recipients.  Based on these results and given that PROGRESA requires school attendance, 
the increase in school expenditures by PROGRESA recipients is the result of project design. On the 
contrary, PROCAMPO has no impact on schooling expenditure; agricultural intensification does not 
seem to imply an increase in child work on the farm and reduction in school expenditure.  This is 
explored further in with the school enrolment equation presented below (equation 5).  
Both PROCAMPO and PROGRESA appear to have a positive and significant effect on expenditures on 
kids clothing; however, as expected, the effect is significantly larger for PROGRESA. The gender 
differentiation suggests that this result is due to an increase in female PROGRESA expenditures on kid’s 
clothes and that male recipients spend signficantly less.  PROCAMPO leads to a significant increase in 
expenditure for health care and personal and home hygiene while, surprisingly, PROGRESA does not. 
This may due to the fact that health care visits required by PROGRESA are subsidised.  The decrease in 
health expenditure by PROGRESA recipients holds true regardless of the gender of the recipient, 
however, male PROGRESA reciepients reduce health expenditure by more than female recipients.  Male 
PROGRESA recipients are then substantially reducing their health exepnditures as a response to the 
subsidized health care provided by PROGRESA.  In terms of energy expenditure, only female 
PROCAMPO recipients appear to spend substantially more on energy.   Expenditure on adult clothing is 
positively related to PROCAMPO which seems to be driven by the fact male PROCAMPO recipients 




From the results we have seen so far, we see that not all the money provided by PROCAMPO is lost on 
alcohol. The program has a positive effect on total and food consumption that is similar to that of 
PROGRESA. From the policy point of view, it is interesting to determine whether PROCAMPO cash 
transfers are directly spent on consumption goods or if this increase is due to past investments which are 
now giving a positive return (multiplier effect), or both. Furthermore, we are interested in analyzing if 
and how this transmission mechanism, from transfers to consumption, differs between male and female 
recipients.  We now move to estimating the investment equations (equations 3 and 3’). 
Table 5. On the left: results of the regression for investment. On the right, test of equality of the coefficients.  
Table 5 summarizes the results for the estimation of total investment as well as agricultural and business 
(non-agricultural) investment. PROCAMPO and PROGRESA transfers are positively and significantly 
associated with total investment although the coefficient on PROCAMPO is substantially higher.  This is 
true regardless of the gender of the recipient. The investment effect comes almost entirely through a 
large increase in agricultural investment found among all PROCAMPO recipients. PROGRESA 
transfers also have a significant impact on agricultural investment although the effect is small and 
appears to be the result of investment by female recipients.  PROGRESA leads to greater business 
investment both in general and in particular by female recipients. Both the characteristics of the program 
and the gender of the recipient matter, as far as investment is concerned. As could be easily expected, 
cash transfer program effects on entrepreneurial activities is bigger when money goes to beneficiaries 
who own the means of production, in this case land as shown by the size of PROCAMPO and 
PROGRESA coefficients: the first is bigger and the difference is statistically significant for both men 
and women. 
With the large investment effect coming from PROCAMPO, the expectation is that the benefit of 
PROCAMPO on consumption would increase over time.  To examine this proposition we turn to 
estimating equation 4, which compares the returns to PROCAMPO in 1996 and 1998.  A summary of 
the results for this analysis is presented in Table 6.  The results indicate that PROCAMPO had a 
significantly larger impact on total expenditure in 1998 than 1996.  This suggests that the investment 
effect of PROCAMPO is leading to higher expenditures overtime.   
Table 6. Time effect of Procampo. 
 
Shifting to the direct outcomes anticipated from PROGRESA, we now look at school enrolment and the 
use of medical services (equations 5 and 6).  Because of program design, we expect PROGRESA to 
have a large positive impact on school enrolment; larger than PROCAMPO’s. In fact, PROCAMPO’s 
effect is uncertain. If money is spent in agricultural investment and this implies intensification of 
productive activities, it is possible that more child labor is employed, with a reduction in school 
enrolment rates. However, it is also possible that investment returns, or even only the increase in income 
Investment, summary Investment, tests of equality
Model 1 coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat Model 1 diff signif diff signif diff signif
PROGRESA (ITT) .071 2.86 .028 2.22 .290 1.92 PROGRESA vs. PROCAMPO < yes < yes > no
PROCAMPO (ITT) .514 17.45 .334 22.08 .075 .40
Model 2 Model 2
PROGRESA received by female .078 3.10 .032 2.47 .288 1.89 F PROGRESA vs. M PROGRESA > yes > yes < no
PROGRESA received by male -.110 -1.20 -.068 -1.43 .426 .79 F PROCAMPO vs. M PROCAMPO >n o>n o>n o
PROCAMPO received by female .554 7.52 .346 9.11 .328 .88 F PROGRESA vs. F PROCAMPO < yes < yes < no
PROCAMPO received by male .509 16.51 .333 21.02 .014 .07 M PROGRESA vs. M PROCAMPO <y e s<y e s>n o
Total Agriculture Business Agriculture Business Total
Time effect, total consumption, summary Test if equality
Model 1 coef t-stat diff. signif.
PROGRESA (ITT) 0.395 5.11
PROCAMPO 98 (ITT) 0.337 4.67




due to PROCAMPO cash transfers, allows the family to reduce the use of child labor, hence increasing 
school enrolment. 
Similarly for the use of medical services, because of program design we expect PROGRESA to have a 
positive impact on the probability of children using medical services. We expect this effect to be bigger 
than that of PROCAMPO, although PROCAMPO may also have a positive impact, as it increases the 
amount of resources available to the household, at least if part of the money is spent in consumption or 
in productive investment. 
Table 7 presents a summary of results for the probit models.  The results of model 1 indicate that both 
PROGRESA and PROCAMPO did lead to an increase in school enrolment, although the effect of the 
former is significantly larger. The effects are, however, differentiated by gender. PROGRESA boosts 
school enrolment when paid to women; but when given to men, its effect is negative, although not 
significantly different from zero. The effect of PROCAMPO is always positive and significant. 
Table 7. Effect on school enrolment and use of medical services (Probit). 
 
The results of model 1 for the use of medical services indicate that both PROGRESA and PROCAMPO 
lead to an increase in the use of medical services, and quite surprisingly the effect of the two programs 
are not significantly different. We note that the ratio of children who benefit from health check-ups is 
very high, around 90%. Lack of medical control is at least in part explained by the distance of the 
facilities.  
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The evaluation of the impact of Progresa and Procampo leads to identify a mix of program and gender 
effects. First of all, both programs seem to boost total and food consumption. When we differentiate by 
gender, however, we find out that male recipient of PROGRESA behave differently than female 
PROGRESA recipients and male PROCAMPO recipients. It is not simply the gender of the recipient 
that matters but the combination of the gender and program design.  This constitutes the first strike 
against conventional wisdom.  Men do not spend on alcohol all the money they receive, at least when the 
transfer is linked to the ownership of means of production.  
Even if the two programs generate a similar effect on total consumption, differences can be found in 
expenditure composition. Procampo seems to be associated to an increase in adult commodities, while 
Progresa increases the expenditure for education and child clothes. This seems to be driven primarily by 
program effects with gender playing a less important role. 
Both Progresa and Procampo induce an increase in school enrolment, although the effect of the former is 
significantly larger. The effects are, however, differentiated by gender. PROGRESA boosts school 
enrolment when paid to women; but when given to men, its effect is negative, although not significantly 
coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat
PROGRESA (ITT) 0.001 6.10 0.001 4.82
PROCAMPO (ITT) 0.000 2.19 0.001 3.14
PROGRESA received by female 0.001 6.43
PROGRESA received by male 0.000 0.01
PROCAMPO received by female 0.001 1.79
PROCAMPO received by male 0.001 2.09
PROGRESA vs. PROCAMPO > Yes > No
F PROGRESA vs. M PROGRESA > Yes
F PROCAMPO vs. M PROCAMPO > No
F PROGRESA vs. F PROCAMPO > No
M PROGRESA vs. M PROCAMPO <N o
Model 1
School enrolment Use of medical services




different from zero. The effect of PROCAMPO is always positive and significant. There is no program 
effect on health care: both programs have a positive impact, with no statistically significant difference. 
Eventually, despite the negative reputation of men, cash transfer programs like PROCAMPO can 
generate similar impacts on consumption as programs like PROGRESA. The increase in consumption 
may happen through different channels. Progresa is directly destined to consumption, while Procampo 
increases investment, in particular for agricultural activities. The analysis of time dimension of 
Procampo effects shows that benefits need time to kick in. Hence, the relationship between gender of the 
recipient, ownership of means of production and investment should be taken into account when policy 
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Table 2: Comparison of Household Groups
T o t a l   G r o u p  1G r o u p  2G r o u p  3G r o u p  4
PG & PC PG PC None
Number of observations 12625 3274 4038 2021 3292
Fraction of total 1.00 0.26 0.32 0.16 0.26
Expenditure per month 1998 (1997 pesos, per adult equivalent)
Total consumption expenditures 170.04 169.63 181.62 155.55 164.77
Food expenditures 136.11 135.88 146.17 123.59 131.27
Schooling expenditure  2.86 2.79 3.11 2.94 2.55
Childrens clothes expenditure  3.33 3.82 3.75 2.68 2.68
Health expenditure  13.16 13.04 13.54 12.60 13.15
Energy expenditure  5.46 5.13 5.78 4.93 5.75
Adult clothes expenditure  2.49 2.57 2.54 2.42 2.37
Other expenditure  6.92 6.47 7.49 6.86 6.71
Investment 1998 (1997 pesos, per adult equivalent)
Total investment 7.35 11.95 5.03 8.87 4.71
Agricultural spending  5.52 8.49 3.91 8.17 2.99
Business investment 1.65 3.00 1.14 0.77 1.48
Transfers per month 1998 (1997 pesos, per adult equivalent)
PROGRESA received  26.21 45.28 45.24 0.00 0.00
PROCAMPO received  5.68 12.68 0.00 14.96 0.00
Household charactersitics (1997)
Household size 5.92 6.46 5.53 6.47 5.52
Age of household head 42.47 44.78 40.39 45.62 40.78
Head is male 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.90
Head speaks indigenous language 0.43 0.46 0.38 0.50 0.43
D e p e n d e n c y  r a t i o 1 . 4 11 . 4 11 . 4 11 . 4 51 . 4 0
Economically active females 1.33 1.47 1.23 1.48 1.24
Economically active males 1.28 1.43 1.19 1.38 1.19
F e m a l e  e d u c a t i o n  ( a v e r a g e ) 2 . 4 22 . 4 82 . 4 82 . 4 02 . 3 1
Male education (average) 2.64 2.76 2.67 2.58 2.53
Denisty of agricultural wage earners in community 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.32
Denisty of non-agricultural wage earners in community 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09
House has dirt floor 0.74 0.70 0.75 0.74 0.78
House has internal pipes 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
House has electric lights 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.62 0.56
Hectares of the irrigated land 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.02
Hectares of the non-irrigated land 1.66 2.61 0.82 3.01 0.91
Cows owned 0.61 0.91 0.36 1.03 0.36
Pigs owned 1.01 1.18 0.77 1.54 0.79
Region 3 - Sierra Negra-Zongolica-Mazateca 13% 12% 12% 15% 13%
Region 4 - Sierra Norte-Otomí Tepehua  19% 14% 22% 16% 22%
Region 5 - Sierra Gorda 42% 46% 42% 40% 40%
Region 6 - Montaña (Guerrero)  11% 11% 9% 14% 12%
Region 12 - Huasteca (San Luis Potosi) 1% 1% 1% 2% 1%
Region 27 - Tierra Caliente (Michoacan)  12% 11% 13% 10% 11%
Region 28 - Altiplano (San Luis Potosi) 2% 5% 1% 3% 1%
Percentage of households in group / living in
Table 4 – Expenditure categories, summary and tests of equality
M o d e l  1 c o e ft - s t a tc o e ft - s t a tc o e ft - s t a tc o e ft - s t a tc o e ft - s t a tc o e ft - s t a tc o e ft - s t a t
PROGRESA (ITT) .240 3.30 .024 5.48 .023 9.48 -.006 -.81 .001 .21 .003 1.02 .002 .28
PROCAMPO (ITT) .295 5.73 .003 .63 .008 2.75 .028 2.71 .008 1.77 .013 4.38 -.001 -.20
Model 2
PROGRESA received by female .245 3.32 .024 5.50 .024 9.72 -.004 -.56 .002 .29 .003 1.03 .003 .41
PROGRESA received by male .120 1.19 .020 1.14 .005 .89 -.057 -3.15 -.011 -1.07 .001 .11 -.022 -1.41
PROCAMPO received by female .448 3.16 .005 .63 .011 .80 .066 1.67 .026 1.94 -.002 -.34 -.018 -1.28
PROCAMPO received by male .279 5.29 .003 .54 .007 2.90 .024 2.25 .006 1.39 .014 4.65 .001 .08
M o d e l  1 d i f fs i g n i fd i f fs i g n i fd i f fs i g n i fd i f fs i g n i fd i f fs i g n i fd i f fs i g n i fd i f fs i g n i f
PROGRESA vs. PROCAMPO < no > yes > yes < yes < no < yes > no
Model 2
F PROGRESA vs. M PROGRESA > no > no > yes > yes > no > no > no
F PROCAMPO vs. M PROCAMPO >n o>n o>n o>n o>n o<y e s<n o
F PROGRESA vs. F PROCAMPO <n o>y e s>n o<y e s<y e s>n o>n o
M PROGRESA vs. M PROCAMPO <n o>n o<n o<y e s<n o<n o<n o
Food
Food Other  School Kid's clothes Health Energy Adult clothes







Table A1: Total consumption expenditure
November, 1997 pesos, per adult equivalent
coef t-stat coef t-stat
Transfers per month per capita PROGRESA (ITT) .274 3.14
PROCAMPO (ITT) .360 5.82
PROGRESA received by female .283 3.20
PROGRESA received by male .050 .44
PROCAMPO received by female .545 3.21
PROCAMPO received by male .342 5.38
Household charactersitics (1997) Household size (in logs) -95.058 -15.80 -96.055 -15.86
Age of household head -.285 -3.30 -.276 -3.20
Head is male 7.497 1.81 9.654 2.38
Head speaks indigenous language -17.304 -8.67 -17.222 -8.63
Dependency ratio .942 .41 1.280 .55
Economically active females 3.397 1.62 3.598 1.71
Economically active males -4.459 -2.13 -4.176 -1.99
Female education (average) -.325 -.54 -.303 -.51
Male education (average) -1.441 -2.47 -1.469 -2.52
Denisty of agricultural wage earners in community -1.524 -.19 -1.494 -.19
Denisty of non-ag wage earners in community -9.611 -.64 -9.872 -.66
House has dirt floor -24.025 -10.85 -24.002 -10.86
House has internal pipes 2.214 .52 2.259 .53
House has electric lights .472 .25 .382 .21
Hectares of the irrigated land 3.705 1.76 3.428 1.59
Hectares of the non-irrigated land -.483 -1.81 -.465 -1.74
Cows owned 1.545 2.45 1.536 2.45
Pigs owned -.638 -2.30 -.650 -2.35
Regional dummies Region 4 - Sierra Norte-Otomí Tepehua  -.779 -.23 -.746 -.22
Region 5 - Sierra Gorda -11.853 -4.14 -11.800 -4.12
Region 6 - Montaña (Guerrero)  -30.146 -7.69 -30.135 -7.68
Region 12 - Huasteca (San Luis Potosi) -6.719 -.83 -7.068 -.88
Region 27 - Tierra Caliente (Michoacan)  17.929 4.58 17.767 4.55
Region 28 - Altiplano (San Luis Potosi) -17.175 -2.84 -16.804 -2.78
Constant 362.520 37.01 360.843 37.29
Model 1 Model 2
.20 .20 R-squared